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INTRODUCTION

Illinois has not adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence. Accordingly, the common law of Illinois continues to be the primary
source of evidentiary rules. The purpose of this article is to inform
the reader of significant evidentiary decisions of the Illinois
supreme and appellate courts during the Survey year. When appropriate, state and federal legislation is also discussed.
II.

WITNESSES

A. Impeachment
1.

Right to Confrontation

In People v. Triplett,I the Illinois Supreme Court had the opportunity to delineate the permissible scope of cross-examination
designed to impeach and demonstrate bias of a juvenile delinquent
witness.2 In Triplett, the State's only occurrence witness was a sixteen year old youth who testified that he observed the defendant
commit an armed robbery.3 According to the testimony of the juvenile witness and police, he said nothing to the police until they
told him that he would go to jail unless he told them what he
knew. 4 The witness's juvenile record indicated that he had contacts with police before the date of the crime in question.' Moreover, during the period between the crimes and the defendant's
trial, 6 the State had filed eleven juvenile delinquency petitions
against the witness. Finally, at the time of the defendant's trial,
the witness was in the custody of the Department of Corrections
after being adjudged delinquent based on a burglary charge.'
Although such factors might indicate bias and reflect poorly upon
the witness's credibility, the trial court prohibited defense counsel
from exposing those points on cross-examination.9
The Triplett court began its analysis by discussing impeachment
1. 108 Ill. 2d 463, 485 N.E.2d 9 (1985).
2. Id. at 481-83, 485 N.E.2d at 18.
3. Id. at 469-70, 485 N.E.2d at 12.
4. Id. at 470, 485 N.E.2d at 12.
5. Id. at 473, 485 N.E.2d at 14.
6. Id. The defendant's first conviction was reversed and the case was remanded for
trial. People v. Triplett, 99 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 425 N.E.2d 1236 (1st Dist. 1981).
7. Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d at 474, 485 N.E.2d at 14. Three petitions were dismissed without prejudice on the State's motion and four petitions were stricken with leave to reinstate on the State's motion. Id.
8. Id. at 473-74, 485 N.E.2d at 14.
9. Id.
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by evidence of other crimes and bias.' ° The court explained that
police contacts and arrests that tend to show the bias or interest of
the witness may be exposed during cross-examination."I In the
facts at issue, however, the court concluded that the witness's contacts with police did not indicate that the witness had anything to
gain or lose by testifying.12 Therefore, the trial court properly had
prohibited defense counsel from revealing this information during
cross-examination. 3 In addition, the supreme court concluded
that the evidence of police contacts was too remote, uncertain, and
10. Id. at 474, 485 N.E.2d at 14. The court noted that a "witness may be impeached
by attacking his character by proof of conviction of an infamous crime. For this purpose,
only convictions may be proved, and proof of arrests, indictments, charges or actual commission of a crime are not admissible." Id. at 475, 485 N.E.2d at 15 (quoting People v.
Mason, 28 Ill. 2d 396, 400, 192 N.E.2d 835, 837 (1963)). Nevertheless, showing interest,
bias or motive to testify is an accepted mode of impeachment. Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d at 475,
485 N.E.2d at 15. Thus, the fact that a witness has been arrested or charged with a crime
may be introduced when it would show that his testimony might be influenced by interest, bias, or motive to falsely testify. Id. See also Mason, 28 Ill. 2d at 401, 192 N.E.2d at
837 (defendant allowed to cross-examine state witnesses about their suspensions as narcotic investigators); People v. Wilkerson, 87 Ill. 2d 151, 156, 429 N.E.2d 526, 528 (1981)
(court should have allowed defendant to cross-examine state's witness about crimes with
which she was charged); People v. Barr, 51 Ill. 2d 50, 51, 280 N.E.2d 708, 710 (1972)
(defendant may inquire into the dropping of charges against a state witness.)
The court also added that it is immaterial whether the arrest or charge used in the
impeachment involves the same occurrence for which the defendant is on trial. Triplett,
108 Ill. 2d at 475, 485 N.E.2d at 15 (citing Mason, 28 Ill. 2d at 401, 192 N.E.2d at 837).
The court stated that when a crossexaminer impeaches a witness for interest, bias, or
motive, the evidence must infer that the witness has something to gain or lose by his
testimony. Triplett, 108 111. 2d at 475-76, 485 N.E.2d at 15. Therefore, the evidence may
not be too remote or uncertain. Id. at 476, 485 N.E.2d at 15. Accord People v. Gonzalez,
104 Ill. 2d 332 472 N.E.2d 417 (1984); People v. Wilkerson, 87 Ill. 2d 151, 429 N.E.2d
526 (1981); People v. Handley, 51 111. 2d 229, 282 N.E.2d 131 (1972); People v. Barr, 51
Ill. 2d 50, 280 N.E.2d 708 (1972); People v. Mason, 28 Ill. 2d 396, 192 N.E.2d 835
(1963); People v. Merz, 122 Ill. App. 3d 972, 977, 461 N.E.2d 1380, 1384 (2nd Dist.
1984); People v. Phillips, 95 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 420 N.E.2d 837 (1st Dist. 1981).
Moreover, to cross-examine a witness to show bias, interest, or motive, a defendant
need not show that any promises of leniency have been made or expectations of special
favor exist in the witness' mind. Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d at 476, 485 N.E.2d at 15. The
defense also may inquire into those promises or expectations. Id.; People v. Freeman,
100 Ill. App. 3d 478, 481, 426 N.E.2d 1220, 1222 (2nd Dist. 1981).
11. Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d at 476, 485 N.E.2d at 16. Police contacts and arrests that do
not lead to conviction nevertheless may be used to impeach a witness providing that they
tend to show bias. Id. Ordinarily, bias can be shown when the witness has been arrested
and the charge is still pending at the time of testimony. Id. at 475, 485 N.E.2d at 16-17.
12. Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d at 477, 485 N.E.2d at 16. The court's holding on this issue
comports with the general rule in Illinois that "police contacts" and arrests are not the
proper subjects of impeachment unless they result in felony convictions or misdemeanors
in which the crime reflects dishonesty. M. GRAHAM, CLEARY & GRAHAM'S HANDBOOK
OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE § 609.3 (1983).
13. Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d at 477, 485 N.E.2d at 16.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 18

speculative to be allowed into evidence.14
The court, however, reversed the defendant's convictions because the trial court had precluded the cross-examination of the
witness concerning his juvenile record of delinquency petitions and
custodial status.1 5 Relying upon the United States Supreme Court
case of Davis v.Alaska,' 6 the Illinois Supreme Court held that a
juvenile record is not forever closed and that it may be opened to
impeach the credibility of a juvenile witness whose bias is in question.I7 Accordingly, the court held that defense counsel should
have been allowed to cross-examine the witness about his custodial
status at the time of his trial testimony and about pending juvenile8
petitions which were stricken by the state with leave to reinstate.'
Perhaps the most significant aspect of this case is that the court
predicated its holding on the sixth amendment's right to confrontation clause. 19 Had the holding been limited solely to the issue of
the scope of impeachment or cross-examination, it would have
been incumbent upon the court to evaluate the prejudice flowing
from an error of lesser magnitude. By basing its holding on the
confrontation clause, the Triplett court, a priori, found "constitutional error of the first magnitude 20and no amount of showing of
want of prejudice [could] cure it."
14. Id.
15. Id. at 481-83, 485 N.E.2d at 18-19. The supreme court held that the defendant
was denied his right to confront the witness when the trial court denied the cross-examination of the witness to show that the witness was in custody when he testified. Id. at
481, 485 N.E.2d at 18. This holding was based in part on section 210(1)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act which provides in relevant part:
Evidence and adjudications in proceedings under this Act shall be admissible:
(c) .. .in criminal proceedings in which anyone who has been adjudicated
delinquent under Section 2-2 is to be a witness, and then only for purposes
of impeachment and pursuant to the rule of evidence for criminal trials.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 702-10(1)(c) (1985).
Although the court did not speculate how the witness's credibility might be affected
when the jury learned that he was in custody, it did state that every effort must be made
to allow a jury to assess accurately a witness's reliability. Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d at 485, 485
N.E.2d at 20. For more information regarding evidentiary considerations of prior crimes,
see M. GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 608.
16. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
17. 108 Ill. 2d at 480-84, 485 N.E.2d at 17-19.
18. Id. at 486, 485 N.E.2d at 20.
19. Id. at 479, 485 N.E.2d at 17.
20. Id. (quoting Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3 (1966)).
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2.

Contradiction by Other Evidence

The Illinois Supreme Court case of People v. Gorney,21 decided
during the Survey period, presented the issue of whether a defendant may impeach a rape victim's testimony by introducing evidence of prior false accusations of rape. At trial, the defendant
sought to impeach the victim's credibility by introducing evidence
of a statement made by the victim five months earlier which revealed her intent to fabricate attempted rape.22 The trial court,
however, excluded this evidence on the grounds that it was speculative and non-probative. 23 Although the supreme court indicated
that this evidence was admissible, it concluded that the trial court's
error, if any, was harmless.24
3.

Prior Inconsistent Statements

In People v. King,25 the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether a witness's prior inconsistent statement about the
defendant's guilt is admissible when made outside the defendant's
presence. The court held that such statements appropriately were
admitted into evidence.26
In King, police arrested the defendant for the murder and armed
robbery of a retail store clerk. 27 During questioning, the defendant
confessed to the crime in question and to another restaurant robbery.2 8 At trial, however, a defense witness testified that the defendant was not involved in the robbery. 29 That witness then
denied the truthfulness of grand jury testimony in which he implicated the defendant in the retail store crimes. 30 Cross-examination
21. 107 Ill. 2d 53, 481 N.E.2d 673 (1985).
22. Id. at 58-59, 481 N.E.2d at 675 (1985). The defendant stood trial for, and was
convicted of, home invasion, attempted rape, and aggravated battery. Id. at 55, 481
N.E.2d at 673.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 61, 481 N.E.2d at 676. The Gorney court reaffirmed the right to crossexamine a witness to show prejudice or other factors which might influence testimony,
but placed firmly within the discretionary province of the trial court the right to exclude
evidence when its relevancy is so speculative that it is of little probative value. Id. at 60,
481 N.E.2d at 675. Accord People v. Lynch, 104 Ill. 2d 194, 470 N.E.2d 1018 (1984);
People v. Manion, 67 Ill. 2d 564, 367 N.E.2d 1313 (1974); People v. Mikel, 73 Ill. App.
3d 21, 391 N.E.2d 550 (4th Dist. 1979). For a further discussion of contradiction by other
evidence, see M.GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 607.8.
25. 109 Ill. 2d 514, 488 N.E.2d 949, cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 249 (1986).
26. Id. at 530-31, 488 N.E.2d at 958.
27. Id. at 521, 488 N.E.2d at 953.
28. Id. at 521-23, 488 N.E.2d at 953-54.
29. Id. at 527, 488 N.E.2d at 956.
30. Id.
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of the defense witness and rebuttal testimony of an assistant state's
attorney revealed details of the grand jury testimony. 3 The
supreme court noted that the defense witness's grand jury testimony, which was made under oath, would be admissible under
current Illinois law.32
Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court again attempted to put to rest
the notion that statements inculpatory of the defendant must be
made in the defendant's presence if they are to be introduced at
trial. In fact, no such limitation had ever existed. Instead, the real
concern is whether the jury will be able to distinguish the proper
from the improper use of evidence. In these circumstances, a court
should caution the jury when the evidence is to be used solely for
its effect on credibility and not for its substance. 3
4.

34
Prior Bad Acts

The King court also considered whether evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts could be admitted to establish voluntariness of
31. Id. at 526-27, 488 N.E.2d at 956.
32. Id. at 530, 488 N.E.2d at 957. Pursuant to statute, prior inconsistent statements
made by a witness can be admitted into evidence under the following conditions:
(a) the statement is consistent with his testimony at the hearing or trial, and
(b) the witness is subject to cross-examination concerning his statement, and
(c) the statement(1) was made under oath at a trial, hearing or other proceeding, or
(2) narrates, describes, or explains an event or condition of which the witness had personal knowledge, and
(A) the statement is proved to have been written or signed by the witness, or
(B) the witness acknowledged under oath the making of the statement
either in his testimony at the hearing or trial in which the admission into evidence is being sought, or at a trial, hearing, or other
proceeding, or
(C) the statement is proved to have been accurately recorded by a tape
recorder, videotape recording, or any other similar means of sound
recording.
Nothing in this section shall render a prior inconsistent statement inadmissible
for the purposes of impeachment because such statement was not recorded or
otherwise fails to meet the criteria setforth herein.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-10.1 (1985).
33. The trial judge in King had instructed the jury that the testimony was not evidence that the defendant had made a confession to the defense witness as the details of
the grand jury testimony might suggest. King, 109 Ill. 2d at 528-30, 488 N.E.2d at 957.
34. Common law historically has permitted inquiries into the associations and
personal history of a witness, including misconduct which tends to discredit his
character, even though it has not been the basis for the conviction of a crime. C. J.
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE (1984). See also FED. R. EVID. 608(b); 3A Wigmore, Evidence
§ 981-87 (Chadbourne rev. 1970);
Evidence of the prior crimes is admissible if for some purpose other than to establish
the defendant's propensity to commit crime. See e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(b); People v.
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a confession. In addition to confessing to the charged armed robbery and murder, the King defendant had confessed to another restaurant robbery.35 At trial, the court admitted the other crimes
evidence on the theory that it rebutted the defendant's claim that
the police had coerced his confession and that it was relevant to
establish the accuracy of the confession. 36 The supreme court affirmed the trial court's ruling.37
King broadened the use of "other crimes" evidence in criminal
cases. Normally, other crimes of a defendant or witness may not
be used except to impeach credibility. The concern is that the
other crimes will be used to show a character propensity which the
jury would then use to the prejudice of the defendant. A long recognized exception to that rule is that the other crimes may be used
substantively when the intent is not to show character but rather to
show a specific relevant purpose such as showing modus operandi,
motive, knowledge, intent preparation, plan, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.38 Ordinarily, the other crime or act admitted
must be of a signature-like similarity to the crime on trial. In King,
however, the court admitted the witness' admission of his own involvement in the robbery on the theory that the admission would
"4corroborate the defendant's statements in his confession concerning the two offenses."' 39 Apparently, the rationale for the admissibility of "other crimes" must now be expanded to include those
other crimes which corroborate evidence offered at trial against the
defendant.
In People v. Buggs, 4° the Illinois Supreme Court also expanded
the permissible extent of the use of prior bad act evidence. In
Buggs, the court considered whether the admission of testimony
regarding a defendant's prior bad acts denied him a fair evaluation
of his insanity defense.4" During the cross-examination of a defense psychiatrist, the State presented the fact that the defendant
King, 109 Ill. 2d at 530, 488 N.E.2d at 958; People v. Bartall, 98 Ill. 2d 294, 456 N.E.2d
59 (1983).
35. King, 109 Ill. 2d at 523, 488 N.E.2d at 953.
36. Id. at 531, 488 N.E.2d at 958. Additionally, the other crimes evidence undermined the defendant's claim of coercion by validating a defense witness's testimony
which implicated the defendant. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
37. King, 109 Ill. 2d at 552, 488 N.E.2d at 968.
38. M. GRAHAM, supra note 12, at § 404.6.
39. King, 109 Ill. 2d at 531, 488 N.E.2d at 958.
40. 112 Ill. 2d 284, 493 N.E.2d 332 (1986).
41. Id. at 288, 493 N.E.2d at 333. The charge stemmed from a fight in which the
defendant splashed his wife with gasoline and lit her on fire. Id. at 287-88, 493 N.E.2d at
333.
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previously had stabbed a woman and had shot a revolver between
his son's legs.42 The court rejected defendant's argument that the
evidence of the prior bad acts had no probative value, noting that
almost every aspect of a defendant's life is relevant when he raises
the insanity defense.43 Accordingly, the court held that the trial
court properly had admitted the bad acts evidence."
Illinois courts traditionally have declined to permit cross-examiners to question a witness as to any "bad acts" committed in the
past, felony convictions and misdemeanor crimen falsi 45 notwithstanding. 46 In Buggs, the court allowed cross-examination as to
the prior bad acts of the defendant, not during the impeachment of
the defendant or a reputation witness, but rather during the crossexamination of a defense expert testifying as to the defendant's insanity at the time of the offense. Buggs, therefore, does not alter
existing Illinois law on impeachment.47 Rather, Buggs clarifies the
permissible scope of cross-examination of an expert in an insanity
case by holding that such examination may include past acts of the
defendant even if those same acts would not have been admissible
during the cross-examination of the defendant or any lay witness.48
B. Opinions and Expert Testimony
1. Lay Opinions
The trend in Illinois has been to follow the lead of the Federal
Rules of Evidence and liberalize the rules governing admissibility
of opinion testimony. Having previously held that an expert is not
prohibited from offering an opinion as to the ultimate issue, the
Illinois Supreme Court in Freeding-Skokie Roll-Off Service v.
Hamilton4 9 faced the question of whether a lay witness should be
permitted to offer an opinion on the ultimate issue. In Freeding42. Id.
43. Id. at 290, 493 N.E.2d at 334. Accord People v. Vanda, 1 ll1. App. 3d 551, 444
N.E.2d 609 (1st Dist. 1982); People v. Burress, 1 Ill. App. 3d 17, 272 N.E.2d 390 ( 4th
Dist. 1971). Relevancy, however, remains a prerequisite for the admission of any evidence. See, e.g., People v. Free, 94 Ill. 2d 378, 413, 447 N.E.2d 218 (1983).
44. Buggs, 112 Ill. 2d at 289, 493 N.E.2d at 334.
45. Crimen falsi refers to crimes in the nature of perjury, false statement, criminal
fraud, or other crimes which involve deceitfulness. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (5th
ed. 1979).
46. See, e.g., People v. Norwood, 54 Ill. 2d 253, 296 N.E.2d 852 (1973); People v.
Celmars, 332 Ill. 113, 163 N.E. 421 (1928).
47. Compare the Buggs decision with impeachment in federal courts. See FED. R.
EvID. 608(b).
48. The Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District discussed prior bad acts in
People v. Hendricks, 145 Ill. App. 3d 71, 495 N.E.2d 85 (4th Dist. 1986).
49. 108 Ill. 2d 217, 483 N.E.2d 524 (1985).
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Skokie, the plaintiffs sought recovery of damages to their truck allegedly caused by the defendant's negligence.50 Over the defendant's objection, the trial court admitted opinion testimony of the
plaintiff driver and an occurrence witness that the plaintiff could
not have avoided the accident.5 Despite the court's previous
adoption of Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703, and 705,52 the
Freeding-Skokie court refrained from explicitly adopting Federal
Rule of Evidence 704.53 Instead, the court decided the issue based
on the bottom-line consideration in all opinion testimony rulings:
whether or not the opinion would be helpful to the jury. 54 Because
the lay opinions were not helpful to the understanding of the witness's testimony, the court held that the trial court erroneously had
admitted them.55
2.

Basis of Opinion Testimony by Experts

Since the Illinois Supreme Court's 1981 decision in Wilson v.
Clark,5 6 adopting Federal Rules of Evidence 70357 and 705,58 Illinois courts have been grappling with questions about the admissibility of expert testimony. In Wilson, the court held that experts'
opinions need not be based solely upon facts which are admissible
into evidence. 9 The opinions need only be based upon facts or
50. Id. at 218, 483 N.E.2d at 524.
51. Id. at 219, 483 N.E.2d at 525.
52. Wilson v. Clark, 84 I11.2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (1981) (adopting FED. R. EVID.
702, 703, 705). Accord J.L. Simmons Co. v. Firestone T. & R. Co., 126 Ill.App.3d 859,
467 N.E.2d 327 (1984).
53. Prior to Freeding-Skokie, the Illinois Supreme Court had not addressed the issue
of whether a lay witness may present an opinion on the ultimate issue. Many of the
federal and state courts which allow lay opinion testimony on an ultimate issue rely on
Federal Rule of Evidence 704. Federal Rule of Evidence 704 provides in relevant part
that: "testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact."
54. Freeding-Skokie, 108 I11.2d at 222-23, 383 N.E.2d at 527.
55. Id. at 223, 383 N.E.2d at 527.
56. 84 Ill. 2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (1981).
57. FED. R. EvID. 703 provides:
The facts or data in which the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data
need not be admissible in evidence.
58.

FED. R. EVID. 705 provides:

The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons
therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the
court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose
the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.
59. Wilson, 84 Ill. 2d at 192, 417 N.E.2d at 1325.
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data perceived by or made known to the expert when those facts or
data are of the type "reasonably relied upon" by experts in the field
in forming opinions or inferences. 6° The fact that the expert's
opinion in Wilson was based, in part, upon hospital records which,
under Supreme Court Rule 236 should not have been admitted into
evidence, was not of consequence because the records were of the
type reasonably relied upon by experts in similar situations.61
Wilson has left a number of unanswered questions which will
continue to pose doctrinal difficulties for Illinois courts. For example, how is the trial judge to determine whether or not particular
facts or data are of the type reasonably relied upon in the field?
The trend is clearly to allow experts "great liberality" in determining the basis of the opinion, 62 and to encourage trial judges to exercise their discretion in favor of admissibility, with the fact-finder
left to determine the weight of the testimony. In that regard, experts have been allowed to base conclusions upon conversations
with the defendant himself,63 the content of which may be disclosed in court as the basis for the conclusion, or upon conversations with IRS agents about the defendant's sanity,' 4 or upon
notations made by unskilled or untrained persons. 6 The focus of
the trial judge's inquiry on the threshold admissibility question
should be whether or not the facts or data relied upon possess some
indicia of reliability or trustworthiness.66 If there is no showing of
unreliability, the court does not abuse its discretion when it admits
the opinion evidence and leaves it to the jury to determine what
weight to accord the evidence.67
The second pending issue after Wilson concerns whether and to
what extent the facts or data reasonably relied upon by the expert
can be disclosed to the jury, particularly when those facts or data
would not otherwise be admissible. That issue formed the centerpiece of the Illinois Supreme Court's recent holding in People v.
Anderson.68 In Anderson, the Illinois Supreme Court determined
the extent to which a defendant's expert witness could disclose the
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
1983).
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 193, 417 N.E.2d at 1326.
Id. at 192, 417 N.E.2d at 1325.
See, e.g., Mannino v. International Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 846, 852 (6th Cir. 1981).
See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 113 Ill. 2d 1, 495 N.E.2d 485 (1986).
See, e.g., United States v. Sims, 514 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1975).
See, e.g., Manning v. Mock, 119 I11.App. 3d 788, 457 N.E.2d 447 (4th Dist.
Henry v. Brenner, 138 I11.App. 3d 609, 486 N.E.2d 934 (3rd Dist. 1985).
Manning v. Mock, 119 111. App. 3d 788, 457 N.E.2d 447 (4th Dist. 1983).
113 Ill. 2d 1, 485 N.E.2d 485, cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 658 (1986).
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basis of his diagnosis to the jury. 69 The court held that an expert
may reveal the contents of material upon which he reasonably relied to explain the basis of his opinion.7 °
In Anderson, the defendant was found guilty of murder.7 ' At
trial, the defense called as an expert witness a psychiatrist who had
reviewed various criminal and psychiatric records.7 2 The expert
testified that the defendant could not conform his conduct to the
law at the time of the shooting. 73 The lower court, however, prohibited the expert from revealing on direct examination the facts or
opinions contained in reports upon which he relied in making his
diagnosis. 74 The reports included evaluations by psychiatrists, doctors, and counselors of the defendant. 75 The7 trial
court allowed the
6
expert to say only that he used the reports.
In deciding the issue before it, the supreme court in Anderson
analyzed the holdings of two landmark cases in Illinois law, People
v. Ward77 and Wilson v. Clark.7 a In Ward, the supreme court had
69. Id. at 7, 495 N.E.2d at 487.
70. Id. at 9, 495 N.E.2d at 488.
71. Id. at 3, 495 N.E.2d at 486. After the defendant was sentenced to death, the case
came before the supreme court on direct appeal. The only material issue at trial was the
defendant's sanity. On appeal, the defendant raised thirty-five issues, two of which the
court addressed. The defendant contended that he was denied a fair trial when the lower
court allowed the State to introduce the defendant's response to the Miranda warnings in
order to establish his sanity. Id. at 5, 495 N.E.2d at 486. The court reversed the convictions and remanded the cause for a new trial. Id. at 7, 495 N.E.2d at 487 (citing People v.
Stack, 112 Ill. 2d 301, 493 N.E.2d 339 (1986); Wainwright v. Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. 634
(1986)).
72. Anderson, 113 I11. 2d at 4, 495 N.E.2d at 486.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 7, 495 N.E.2d at 487. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court
should have allowed the psychiatrist to recount certain statements made by the defendant
himself. Id. Federal Rule of Evidence 705 does not provide clear guidance on this issue
because that rule was designed to allow cross-examiners to bring out the facts upon which
the expert opinion is based and does not directly address whether the factual basis can be
brought out on direct examination.
75. Id. at 7, 495 N.E.2d at 487.
76. Id.
77. 61 111. 2d 559, 338 N.E.2d 171 (1975). In Ward, the Illinois Supreme Court held
that expert medical opinion on the issue of insanity based on records compiled by others
which was not admitted into evidence was permissible if the reports were of a type customarily used in the medical profession. Id. at 568, 338 N.E.2d at 177. Ward, however,
did not expressly hold that a psychiatrist could reveal the contents of the report. A
majority of appellate cases have interpreted Ward as meaning that the underlying facts
and opinions could be disclosed. Anderson, 113 Ill. 2d at 10, 495 N.E.2d at 489. Accord
Henry v. Brenner, 138 I11.App. 3d 609, 613, 486 N.E.2d 934 (3rd Dist. 1985). See also
People v. Castro, 113 Ill. App. 3d 265, 446 N.E.2d 1267 (1st Dist. 1983) (physician's
testimony based upon records prepared by another person held admissible); In re
Germich, 103 Ill. App. 3d 626, 431 N.E.2d 1092 (1st Dist. 1981) (psychiatric expert
allowed to rely on a medical center staff intake report).
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held that expert medical opinions based on records compiled by
others which were not admitted into evidence were permissible if
the reports were of a type customarily used in the medical profession.79 The Anderson court concluded that the logic of Federal
Rule of Evidence 703, Wilson, and Ward required that an expert be
permitted to reveal the contents of material upon which he reasonably relied to explain the basis of his opinion.8 The court explained that to prevent an expert from referring to the contents of
material upon which he relied "places an unreal stricture on him
and compels him to be not only less than frank with the jury but
also . . . to appear to base his diagnosis upon reasons which are
flimsy and inconclusive when in fact they may not be."'" Although
much of the underlying basis for the expert's opinion would have
constituted inadmissible hearsay if left standing alone, the court
reiterated that such evidence is not hearsay when considered in
connection with the testimony of an expert.8 2 The court held that
data in the underlying reports should be admitted, not for their
truth, but for the limited purpose of explaining the basis for the
3
expert witness's opinion.1
The court rejected the argument that juries cannot distinguish
between the permissible use of the evidence for evaluation of the
expert, and the impermissible use for substantive proof of the matters discussed in the statements.8 4 In that event, counsel should
argue that the jury is being misled and any resultant prejudice out78. 84 I1U.2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (1981).
79. Ward, 61 I11.2d at 568, 338 N.E.2d at 177.
80. Anderson, 113 Ill. 2d at 9, 495 N.E.2d at 488. See also M.GRAHAM, supra note
12, § 703.1; P. ROTHSTEIN, RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS
AND MAGISTRATES 289 (2d ed. 1985); S.SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 671 (1986);
ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION, EMERGING
PROBLEMS UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 209, 214-15; Diamond and
Loisell, The Psychiatristas an Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and Speculations, 63
MICH. L. REV. 1335, 1353-54 (1965); Dieden & Gasprich, PsychiatricEvidence and Full
Disclosure in the Criminal Trial, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 543, 544 (1964).
81. Anderson, 113 Ill. 2d at 10-11, 495 N.E.2d at 490 (quoting State v. Meyers, 159
W. Va. 353, 358, 222 S.E.2d 300, 304 (1976)).
82. Anderson, 113 Ill.2d at 7, 495 N.E.2d at 487.
83. Id. at 12, 495 N.E.2d at 490. Accord Paddack v. Dave Christensen, Inc., 745
F.2d 1254, 1262 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Ramos, 725 F.2d 1322, 1324 (1 1th Cir.
1984). In effect, the court again has held that the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence
reasonably relied upon by experts because the importance of the evidence to the jury
primarily is in evaluating the strength or weakness of the of the opinion and not the truth
of the matters contained in the out-of-court statements relied upon.
84. Anderson, 113 Ill. 2d at 12, 495 N.E.2d at 490. A judge's limiting instruction
advising the jury to consider the statements only to evaluate the basis of the opinion
should prevent misuse of information. Id. Accord United States v. Madrid, 673 F.2d
1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032, 1037 (5th Cir.
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weighs the probative value of the evidence. The court acknowledged that a "savvy" defendant could manipulate the disclosure
rule to force the admission of his own statements without having to
take the stand or undergo cross-examination. 5 The expert, nonetheless, must undergo cross-examination which allows the prosecution to explore the self-serving nature of the defendant's statements
to the expert.8 6
The Illinois Supreme Court also ruled upon the admission of
psychiatric expert testimony in People v. Wright.8 7 At issue was
whether the trial court prejudiced the defendant's insanity defense
by allowing the State's rebuttal witness, a psychiatrist, to state his
opinion that the defendant's fifteen-year hospitalization resulted
from a treatable personality disorder rather than a mental disease. 88 The expert admitted that he had not considered reports
prepared during the hospitalization period or discussed the hospitalization with treating psychiatrists and that he reached his opinion about the defendant's sanity based solely upon police reports, a
transcript of the defendant's taped confession, materials from previous incarcerations, and a two-hour interview with the defendant. 89 He further testified that it is not unusual to institutionalize
persons with mere personality disorders absent any proof of mental
illnesses.90

Once again, the court relied on Wilson and held that the psychiatrist's testimony was fully admissible. 9' The expert's examination
of the defendant and his review of the other materials provided a
sufficient factual basis to form an opinion as to why the defendant
was hospitalized. 92 Because the jury was aware of the basis of the
doctor's testimony, the jury could determine the weight and credibility of the evidence. 93 Again, the trial judge's role is to determine
the threshold question of admissibility and reserve for the crossexaminer the responsibility of disclosing any weaknesses in the basis for the conclusion.94
1971); Brown Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Centennial Insurance Co., 431 So. 2d 932,
944 (Ala. 1983).
85. Anderson, 113 Ill. 2d at 13, 495 N.E.2d'at 490.
86. Id.
87. 111 Ill. 2d 128, 490 N.E.2d 640 (1985).
88. Id. at 152, 490 N.E.2d at 649.
89. Id. at 153, 490 N.E.2d at 649.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 154, 490 N.E.2d at 649.
92. Id. at 154, 490 N.E.2d at 650.
93. Id. Accord People v. Bilyew, 73 Ill. 2d 294, 302, 383 N.E.2d 212, 215-16 (1978).
94. Other recent cases addressing Wilson include Thomas v. Brandt, 144 Ill. App. 3d
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In Wright, the court also considered whether a lay witness may
offer an opinion as to a person's sanity. The defense counsel in
Wright asked the only eyewitness to the crimes whether she
thought that the defendant had acted in an "irrational," "crazy,"
or "abnormal" manner.95 Counsel also asked whether she thought
the specific acts performed by the defendant were "normal. ' 96 The
trial court sustained objections to those questions but allowed defense counsel to ask whether the witness had ever seen anyone act
like that before.9 7 The supreme court held that a lay witness may
give an opinion about an individual's mental condition but that the
opinion must be based on personally observed facts stated in detail.9" In Wright, the court said that the witness stated those facts
in detail and thus the trial judge possessed discretion to rule on the
scope of cross-examination in this area. 99
The Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District was less inclined to broaden Wilson in Melecosky v. McMarthy Brothers Co.bOO
In Melecosky, decided prior to Anderson, the court affirmed the
trial court's ruling rejecting the plaintiff's attempt to introduce the
doctor's deposition in which the doctor expressed an opinion based
upon the plaintiff's statements.10 1 As the basis for excluding the
expert opinion, the court noted that the subjective, self-serving
complaints of the plaintiff to a nontreating physician were not inherently reliable. 102 In light of the holding in Anderson that the
self-serving nature of a defendant's statements to an expert are
more appropriate when considering the weight rather than admis95, 493 N.E.2d 1142 (5th Dist. 1986); In re Village of Bridgeview, 139 Ill. App. 3d 744,
487 N.E.2d 1109 (1st Dist. 1985); Johnson v. Commonwealth Ed., 133 Ill. App. 3d 472,
478 N.E.2d 1057 (lst Dist. 1985).
95. Wright, 111 Ill.
2d at 147, 490 N.E.2d at 646-47.
96. Id. at 148, 490 N.E.2d at 647. When the trial judge inquired into defense counsel's questioning, counsel explained that he was "trying to get [the witness] to show the
jury that the specific acts that [defendant] performed-that none of the specific acts he
performed were normal." [sic] Id. at 149, 490 N.E.2d at 647. The defendant raised the
insanity defense based upon a shoe fetish and testified at trial that he was looking for
women's shoes at the time of the offenses. Id. at 140, 490 N.E.2d at 643.
97. Id. at 147-48, 490 N.E.2d at 647.
98. Id. at 148, 490 N.E.2d at 647. Accord People v. Smothers, 55 Ill. 2d 172, 302
N.E.2d 324 (1973); People v. Williams, 38 Ill.
2d 115, 230 N.E.2d 224 (1967); 4 CALLAGHAN'S ILLINOIS EVIDENCE § 7.27 (1983); M. GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 704.3.
99. Wright, 111111. 2d at 149, 490 N.E.2d at 647. Accord People v. Brisbon, 106 Ill.
2d 342, 362, 478 N.E.2d 402, 411 (1986); People v. Owens, 102 Ill. 2d 88, 103, 464
N.E.2d 261, 268 (1984).
100. 141 Ill. App. 3d 84, 489 N.E.2d 1115 (4th Dist. 1986).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 89, 489 N:E.2d at 1118. See also Jensen v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co.,
24 111. 2d 383, 389, 182 N.E.2d 211, 214-15 (1962) (doctor secured for purpose of testifying not allowed to testify regarding subjective complaints).
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sibility of the opinion, this aspect of Melecosky conceivably could
be decided differently today.
The Melecosky court, however, also based its result on hearsay
considerations. The court explained that statements regarding
pain, symptoms, and the cause of injury when made by a patient to
his doctor for the purpose of diagnosis and treatment usually are
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. 0 3 The court, however, noted that the supreme court had not yet held that statements
made to a physician consulted for purposes of testifying could be
brought before the fact finder under the Wilson edict.'o The court
believed that allowing a nontreating physician to testify about
statements made by the plaintiff as a basis for an opinion would, in
effect, adopt Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4).105 Thus, because
Illinois courts traditionally have held that statements to a nontreating physician are hearsay, the court refused to allow a nontreating
physician to testify about a plaintiff's statements. 106
3.

Locality Rule

In Hansborough v. Kasyak, 10 7 the Illinois Appellate Court for
the Fourth District held that a doctor will not be disqualified as an
expert for his lack of familiarity with local medical practices when
national minimum standards of care exist. 0 8 In Hansborough, the
plaintiff brought a medical malpractice suit to recover damages following a mastectomy. 109 The defendants were Hoopeston Commu103. Melecosky, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 89, 489 N.E.2d at 1118. Accord Shell Oil Co. v.
Industrial Comm., a Ill. 2d 590, 602, 119 N.E.2d 224, 231 (1954); Greineke v. Chicago
City Ry. Co., 234 Ill. 565, 572, 85 N.E. 327, 330 (1908).
104. Melecosky, 141 Ill.App.3d at 90, 489 N.E.2d at 1118.
105. Id. FED. R. EVID. 803 provides in relevant part:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof
insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
106. The court's analysis here is predicated upon the use of the hearsay rule which, as
discussed above, ordinarily does not apply to the expert witness situation, simply because
the facts and data are not offered for their truth but only for the limited purpose of
showing the basis of the opinion. The distinction between treating and non-treating physicians, for purposes of expert testimony, also has been largely eroded by recent Illinois
law.
107. 141 Ill. App. 3d 538, 490 N.E.2d 181 (4th Dist. 1986).
108. Id. at 545, 490 N.E.2d at 186.
109. Id. at 541, 490 N.E.2d at 183.
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nity Memorial Hospital and two surgeons who practiced in
Hoopeston."10 The plaintiff presented the affidavit of an expert witness who stated that he reviewed the record of the plaintiff's medical and surgical care and, based on his personal knowledge,
believed that the defendant doctors lacked sufficient training,
knowledge, and experience to perform the surgery.II' His affidavit
stated that according to the "standard of care, nationwide, and in
Illinois," the operation should have been performed by "surgeons
trained in plastic and3 reconstructive surgery."' 1 2 The trial court
struck the affidavit."
On appeal, the court recognized that Illinois follows a modified
version of the "locality rule.""' 4 A medical expert must then
demonstrate his familiarity with the standard of care under the locality rule before his testimony may establish the standard of
care." 5 As the court stated, the term "locality" has no precise
meaning.1 1 6 If, however, there is only one uniform standard for
treatment, then the national and community standards may be the
same."' More importantly, "a doctor will not necessarily be disqualified as an expert even if he is unfamiliar with the practices of a
particular community as long as there are certain minimum standards of care uniform throughout the country for the particular
practice." 1 The court concluded that the plaintiff's expert, a surgeon and professor from Chicago, was not so unfamiliar with the
medical practice in Hoopeston or similar communities that he
could not state an opinion concerning the applicable standard of
care. '19
110. Id.
111. Id. at 542, 490 N.E.2d at 184.
112. Id. at 543, 490 N.E.2d at 184.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 544, 490 N.E.2d at 185. The modified locality rule requires a doctor to
exercise such care and diligence as a good practitioner in a same or similar community
would render under the same or similar circumstances. Bartimus v. Paxton Community
Hospital, 120 11. App. 3d 1060, 1066, 458 N.E.2d 1072, 1077 (4th Dist. 1983).
115. Hansbrough, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 544, 490 N.E.2d at 185. Accord Thompson v.
Webb, 138 Il1. App. 3d 629, 631-32, 486 N.E.2d 326, 327-28 (4th Dist. 1985).
116. Hansbrough, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 545, 490 N.E.2d at 186. Accord Stogsdill v.
Manor Convalescent Homes, Inc., 35 I11.App. 3d 634, 653-54, 343 N.E.2d 589, 603-04
(2nd Dist. 1976).
117. Hansbrough, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 545, 490 N.E.2d at 186. Accord Hunter v. Sukkar, 111 111. App. 3d 169, 175-76, 443 N.E.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Dist. 1982).
118. Hansbrough, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 545, 490 N.E.2d at 186. Accord Purtill v. Hess,
111 111. 2d 229, 247, 489 N.E.2d 867, 876 (1986).
119. Hansbrough, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 545, 490 N.E.2d at 186.
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III.
A.

HEARSAY

Computer Generated Information

During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court, continuing
the examination of computer records as business record exceptions
to the hearsay rule, drew an important distinction between computer stored and computer generated data. In People v.
Holowko, 20° the supreme court held that records produced by computerized phone-tracing equipment are not hearsay and are admissible into evidence.' 2 ' In Holowko, police charged the defendant
with harassment by telephone' 22 after the complainant informed
local police about harassing phone calls which he had received at
home. 23 During its investigation, the police requested that the Illinois Bell Telephone Company place a trap or tracer on the complainant's phone. 24 This device generated information which
revealed that the complainant had received a call from a phone
owned by the defendant. 25 The trial court found these records
were inadmissible under section 115-5 of the Code of Criminal
' 26
Procedure because they were 2 made "during an investigation."'
The appellate court affirmed.' 1
In reversing the lower courts, the supreme court determined that
the printout of results of computerized telephone-tracing equip120. 109 Ill. 2d 187, 486 N.E.2d 877 (1985).
121. Id. at 193, 486 N.E.2d at 879.
122. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 134, para. 16.4-1(1) (1981).
123. Holowko, 109 Ill. 2d at 189, 486 N.E.2d at 877.
124. Id. A "trap" or "tracer" is an electronic device whereby a computer automatically records the telephone numbers of incoming calls. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. Section 115-5 of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure provides in relevant part:
(a) Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transactions, occurrence, or event, shall be admissible as evidence of such act, transaction,
occurrence or event, if made in the regular course of any business, and if it
was the regular course of business to make such memorandum or record at
the time of such act, transaction, occurrence, or event or within reasonable
time thereafter.
(c) No writing or record made in the regular course of any business shall become admissible as evidence by the application of this section if:
(2) Such writing or record has been made by anyone during an investigation of an alleged offense or during any investigation relating to pending
or anticipated litigation of any kind.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 115-5(a),(c)(2) (1985).
127. Holowko, 109 Ill. 2d at 189, 486 N.E.2d at 877.
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ment is not hearsay evidence, but "represents a self-generated record of its operation."' 28 Therefore, the court held that the
proponent of such records need only satisfy the foundational requirements of showing the recording method of the information
and the proper functioning of the device. 129 To reach this result,
the court distinguished computer generated data from computer
stored data.13 ° In this context, the court concluded that printouts
of the computer stored data constituted hearsay because they represented statements that had been fed into a computer by out-ofcourt declarants.131 On the other hand, computer generated data,
such as the tracer information, represent information generated by
a computer's internal operations and without the aid of a
human.132 Hence, the court concluded that the rationale of excluding untrustworthy business records made by a person in preparation for litigation
did not apply to computer generated
33
information.
B. Hearsay Exceptions
34
1. Business Records'
The Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District recently
grappled with another application of the hearsay rule to computer
records. The court in Victory Memorial Hospital v. Rice 135 did not
resort to the computer generated and computer stored data distinc128. Id. at 192, 486 N.E.2d at 879 (quoting State v. Armstead, 432 So.2d 837, 840
(La. 1983)). In Holowko, the State had contended that computer records do not qualify
as possible exceptions to the hearsay rule, but rather as exhibits of "demonstrative evidence of a scientific test or experiment." Holowko, 109 Ill. 2d at 191, 486 N.E.2d at 878.
The court did not address the State's novel theory. The effect of this theory would be to
categorize the computer records as facts or data relied upon by an expert which, in and of
themselves, would not necessarily be admitted into evidence.
129. Holowko, 109 I11.
2d at 193, 486 N.E.2d at 879.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. For a discussion of computer stored information and the hearsay rule, see
infra notes 184-92 and accompanying text.
133. Holowko, 109 Ill. 2d at 192, 486 N.E.2d at 879.The court also ruled that the
accuracy and reliability of computer generated information is judicially noticeable, requiring only proof of the accuracy and proper operation of the device under consideration. Id. See also People v. Donahoo, 54 Ill. App. 3d 375, 369 N.E.2d 546 (5th Dist.
1977) (accuracy of Doppler radar held judicially noticeable).
134. An exception to the hearsay rule exists for entries made in the regular course of
business. In order to qualify as an exception, an entry must 1) be made in the regular
course of business, 2) be part of a system of entries, 3) be contemporaneous with the
transaction recorded, 4) lack a motive to misrepresent, and 5) be written.
II J.
WIGMORE, ON EVIDENCE § 518 (1904).
135. 143 Ill. App. 3d 621, 493 N.E.2d 117 (2nd Dist. 1986). See notes 120-33 and
accompanying text.
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tion crafted by the supreme court in Holowko.'36 In Victory,137 the
Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District held that computer
generated hospital bills are admissible into evidence as business
records provided that the proper foundation is presented.13 In
Victory, a hospital suing for the payment of medical and hospital
bills challenged a trial court's ruling that computerized hospital
bills could not be allowed into evidence under the business records
exception to the hearsay rule.13 9
In reversing the lower court's decision, the court explained that
business records supplied by a computer could be admitted into
evidence without the testimony of persons who made the entries if
the following conditions are met: (1) the electronic computing
equipment is recognized as standard; (2) the entries are made in
the regular course of business at or reasonably near the time of the
happening of the event recorded; and (3) the foundation testimony
satisfies the court that the sources of information, method, and
time of preparation indicates the trustworthiness of the evidence
and justifies its admission. 14° Applying this test, the court held
that the plaintiff had presented a proper foundation to support the
bill's trustworthiness by producing some documents of original
entry. 141
Victory signifies an expansion of the business records exception
to the hearsay rule because the court not only exempted the proponent from producing the person who fed the information into the
computer, but it also allowed all of the billing statements and other
records which formed the basis for the data processed material into
evidence. The court predicated this holding on the fact that requiring production of all of the documents of original entry would be
too time consuming. 112 Thus, the court allowed the defendants to
present approximately thirty slips of paper indicating hospital services, although those slips were not actually used when entering the
data. 143
136. Holowko, 109 Ill. 2d 187, 486 N.E.2d 877.
137. 143 Ill. App. 3d 621, 493 N.E.2d 117 (2nd Dist. 1986).
138. Id. at 627, 493 N.E.2d at 121.
139. Id. The billings in Victory obviously were computer stored data emanating
from information supplied by the out-of-court declarants.
140. Id. at 626, 493 N.E. 2d at 120. Accord Grand Liquor Co. v. Department of
Revenue, 67 Ill. 2d 195, 202, 367 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (1977); People v. Morman, 97 Ill.
App. 3d 556, 565, 422 N.E.2d 1065, 1073 (lst Dist.1981); K. North, Computer Evidence
in Illinois, 71 ILL. B.J. 590 (1983).
141. Victory, 143 Ill. App. 3d at 627, 493 N.E.2d at 121.
142. Id. at 626-27, 493 N.E.2d at 120.
143. Id. at 626-27, 493 N.E.2d at 121.
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A more traditional application of the business record exception
to the hearsay rule was at issue in Birch v. Township of Drummer.'" That case involved the issue of whether a record made in
response to an act which previously had not occurred could be admitted into evidence under the business record exception. The Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District held that such a
record qualifies if made in the regular course of business.' 45
In Birch, the plaintiff brought a negligence action against a
township and its highway commissioner for failing to warn her deceased husband about a dangerous roadway condition which contributed to her husband's fatal accident.146 At trial, a civil engineer
and highway superintendent testified that he had hired an engineering firm to perform a safety survey of all county roads. 1 47 The
plaintiff claimed that the exhibit and superintendent's testimony
48 After a verdict for the defendant, the plainconstituted hearsay.'
49
tiff appealed. 1

In affirming the lower court's decision, the court noted that the
business record exception to the hearsay rule depends upon a routine of accuracy. 5 ° The Birch court further noted that a record
made in response to an act which previously has not occurred may
still be admitted into evidence if it was made in the regular course
of business. 15 ' In response to plaintiff's complaint that the highway superintendent was not associated with the firm which prepared the exhibit, the court held that a witness could produce
business records even though he did not make the original entries.' 5 2 In this context, the court ruled that any one familiar with
the business and procedure may establish the foundation for the
records. 5 3 Finally, the court held that Illinois Supreme Court
144. 139 IlL. App. 3d 397, 487 N.E.2d 798 (4th Dist. 1985).
145. Id. at 407, 487 N.E.2d at 805-06.
146. Id. at 399-400, 487 N.E.2d at 801.
147. Id. at 406, 487 N.E.2d at 805.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 399, 487 N.E.2d at 801.
150. Id. at 407, 487 N.E.2d at 805.
151. Id. at 408, 487 N.E.2d at 805-06. See also M. GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 803.10;
Newark Electronics Corp. v. City of Chicago, 130 Ill. App. 2d 1021, 264 N.E.2d 868
(1970) (compilation-computation of water damaged property prepared by a merchandiser
held admissible even though flooding may have occured only once).
152. Birch, 139 Ill. App. 3d at 407, 487 N.E.2d at 806.
153. Id. See also Thomas v. Police Bd., 90 Ill. App. 3d 1101, 414 N.E.2d 11 (1st
Dist. 1980) (evidence properly admitted after court clerk testified that records were kept
in ordinary course of business); Central Steel & Wire Co. v. Coating Research Corp. 53
Ill. App. 3d 943, 369 N.E.2d 140 (5th Dist. 1977) (salesman's testimony concerning billing statement held admissible. The Birch court stated that the motive to falsify the high-
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Rule 236(a) did not require exclusion of the survey because it contained opinions. 154 The appellate court in Birch concluded that the
nature of the study should affect the weight to be attributed to the
survey, rather than the question of admissibility.'"
2.

56
Public Records 1

In Connor v. Shaw,15 7 the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth
District held that the Illinois Department of Public Aid's ("IDPA"
or the "Department") certification of medical expense payments
58
was admissible as a public record exception to the hearsay rule.
In Connor, the plaintiff won a jury verdict for damages resulting
from a car accident. 1 59 Before a trial on the issue of damages,
IDPA intervened." 6 During an adjudication of the Department's
lien against plaintiff's settlement recovery, the Department offered
into evidence its certification of medical payments made on the
plaintiff's behalf.' 6' The trial court refused to admit this evidence
63
and found for the plaintiff. 62 The Department appealed.
The evidence offered consisted of a certification made by the Department's director that IDPA made certain medical payments on
the plaintiff's behalf. The certification included photocopies of
IDPA records listing the payments, some of which contained hand
notations. 6 IDPA contended that the certification and documents were admissible under section 10-13.4 of the Public Aid
Code ("Code") which provides, in sum, that records of the Departway report was nonexistent because it was prepared three months before the accident and
was useless unless accurate. Birch, 139 Ill. App. 3d at 407, 487 N.E.2d at 806.
154. Birch, 139 Ill. App. 3d at 407, 487 N.E.2d at 806.
155. Id.
156. Public records are a widely recognized exception to the hearsay rule and are
admissible as evidence of the facts recited in them. This exception to the hearsay rule is
based on their usual reliability and the inconvenience of requiring public officials to testify
as to their subject matter. C. MCMORMICK, supra note 34, § 315. See generally 5 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 34, §§ 1630-84.
157. 138 I11.App. 3d 429, 485 N.E.2d 1184 (5th Dist 1985).
158. Id. at 433, 485 N.E.2d at 1186.
159. Id. at 430, 485 N.E.2d at 1186.
160. Id. at 43, 485 N.E.2d at 118. The Department intervened pursuant to section
11-22 of the Public Aid Code. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, para. 11-22 (1985). The Public
Aid Code allows the Department a charge or lien "upon all claims, demands, and causes
of action for injuries [to a public aid recipient] for the total amount of medical assistance
provided the recipient from the time of injury to the date if recovery upon such claim,
demand, or cause of action." Id.
161. Cannon, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 430-31, 485 N.E.2d at 1186.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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ment shall be admitted into evidence subject only to the attestation
of the Director.1 65 The court, however, did not discuss whether
this provision of the Code was intended to carve a special exception to the normal foundational requirements for the public
records exception or whether the provision was intended to apply
to proceedings at law outside an administrative context. In holding for the Department, the Fifth District urged that courts consider certification made under the statute reliable because a public
official attested to them in connection with performance of his statutory duties.1 66 Hence, the evidence was admissible as an excep167
tion to the hearsay rule.
IV.

RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS

A.

1
Habit Testimony

6

1

In Bradfield v. Ill. Central GulfRailroad Co. ,169 the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District considered the issue of whether
habit testimony may be admitted into evidence even when eyewitnesses are present. Notwithstanding Illinois precedent to the contrary, the court held that habit testimony could be admitted
1 70
regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses.
In Bradfield, defendant's train and plaintiff decedent's car collided at a train crossing marked only by a "crossbuck" sign.1 71 At
trial, the train crew testified that it began blowing the train's whistle when they were one-quarter mile from the crossing. 72 The decedent's widow, whose home was located next to the tracks,
testified that she heard a whistle blow only immediately before the
crash.1 73 The widow and the decedent's son also testified that
other train crews had failed to sound the whistle when approaching
165. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, para. 10-13.4 (1985).
166. Connor, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 432, 485 N.E.2d at 1187. Accord Department of
Public Aid v. Estate of Wall, 81 111. App. 3d 394, 400, 401 N.E.2d 639, 641-43 (5th Dist.
1980).
167. Connor, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 433, 485 N.E.2d at 1186.
168. Habit testimony concerns a particular activity, routine, or response that is
repeated frequently over a period of time. G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE 121 (1978). Viewed as such, habit testimony is less general than character
testimony and typically is admissible as circumstantial evidence to prove particular
conduct. Id.
169. 137 Ill. App. 3d 19, 484 N.E.2d 365 (5th Dist. 1985).
170. Id. at 23, 484 N.E.2d at 367-68.
171. Id. at 20, 484 N.E.2d at 366.
172. Id. at 21, 484 N.E.2d at 366.
173. Id.
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that crossing on previous occasions.174
On appeal, the court rejected the defendant's contention that
this testimony was erroneously allowed.175 Prior to Bradfield,
habit testimony could be received into evidence only in wrongful
death cases when no one had witnessed the occurrence.1 76 After
considering the criticism of the no eyewitness predicate for the admission of habit testimony, 7 the court specifically adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 406178 which rejects the eyewitness
requirement.1 79 Subsequent to the Survey period, the Illinois
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment. 180
B. Demonstrative Evidence.- Photographs,Motion Pictures
In Amstar Corp. v. Aurora Fast Freight,18 1 the Illinois Appellate
Court for the Third District held that a videotape of an accident
scene may be inadmissible when its vantage point significantly differs from that of a witness to the accident.18 2 During the trial of a
suit for damages arising from a collision of two semi-trailer trucks,
the trial court did not allow the defendants to introduce a video174. Id.
175. Id. at 23, 484 N.E.2d at 368.
176. Id. at 22, 484 N.E.2d at 367. See e.g., Gardner v. Geraghty, 98 Ill. App. 3d 10,
15, 423 N.E.2d 1321, 1324-25 (1st Dist. 1981).
177. Bradfield, 137 Il. App. 3d at 22-23, 484 N.E.2d at 367. For discussion of the
trends regarding habit testimony, see Glatt v. Feist, 156 N.W.2d 819 (N.D. 1968); G.
LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAWS OF EVIDENCE 121-24 (1978); W. LOUISELL, J.
KAPLAN & J. WALTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 337 (1981).

178. Bradfield, 137 Ill. App. 3d at 22-23, 484 N.E.2d at 367. FED. R. EVID. 406
provides:
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization,
whether corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is
relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular
occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice.
179. Bradfield, 137 Ill. App. 3d at 23, 484 N.E.2d at 368. See C. MCCORMICK, EviDENCE § 195, at 463-64 (1972). Nonetheless, the court held that no prejudicial error
occurred in the case. Bradfield, 137 Ill. App. 3d at 23, 484 N.E.2d at 368. The defendant
also contended that the trial court erred in refusing to allow a professional engineer to
testify about the sight distances at the crossing. Id. at 21-23, 484 N.E.2d at 368. In
supporting the trial court's decision, the appellate court restated the well-settled rule that
expert opinions are not admitted unless the subject is difficult to comprehend or explain.
Id. at 24, 484 N.E.2d at 368. Accord Hernandez v. Power Construction Co., 73 Ill. 2d 90,
99, 382 N.E.2d 1201, 1205 (1978).
180. Bradfield v. Ill. Central Gulf R.R. Co., No. 62509, slip op. at 4 (March 1986).
On appeal to the supreme court, the defendant contended that the circuit court erred on
admitting the habit testimony. Id. at 2. The court refused to decide this issue after concluding that the defendant had failed to preserve the issue for review. Id. at 3.
181. 141 Ill. App. 3d 705, 490 N.E.2d 1067 (3rd Dist. 1986).
182. Id. at 709, 490 N.E.2d at 1070.
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tape of the accident scene which was taken from a moving car.18 3
The Amstar court stated that motion pictures and videotapes
could be admitted into evidence providing that they are material
and relevant.' 84 The court, however, concluded that the videotape
could be excluded from evidence if it might confuse or mislead the
jury. Is8 Specifically, the appellate court noted that when a photograph depicted a vantage point different from a witness whose testimony was sought to be impeached, the photo could be
excluded.I 6 In the facts at issue, the court concluded that the vantage point from the videotape camera aimed through an automobile windshield and the actual view of a driver in a semitractor
8 7
would be significantly dissimilar and potentially misleading.
Thus, the appellate court ruled that the trial court
had acted
188
within its discretion when it excluded the evidence.
V.

RULE OF COMPLETENESS

1 89

In People v. Williams, 9° the Illinois Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether a criminal defendant may play the actual audio tape-recorded statements to a jury after police officers have already testified about the taking of the statements.' 9 The court
held that the recordings should be admitted if they have independent relevance. 92
In Williams, police officers twice interrogated the defendant after arresting him for murder."' At trial, the officers who interviewed the defendant testified during the State's case in chief
183. Id. at 708, 490 N.E.2d at 1070.
184. Id.
185. Id. See also Eizerman v. Behn, 9 Ill. App. 2d 263, 132 N.E.2d 788 (1st Dist.
1956) (motion pictures and photographs of a washing machine alleged to have caused
plaintiff's injuries not allowed into evidence because they had no demonstrative value);
People v. Rolan, 71 Ill. App. 3d 746, 390 N.E.2d 107 (1st Dist. 1979) (photographs which
were taken from a vantage point different from that of a witness might confuse a jury).
186. Amstar, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 708, 490 N.E.2d at 1070.
187. Id. at 709, 490 N.E.2d at 1070.
188. Id.
189. The rule of completeness provides that "if one party introduces part of an
utterance or writing, the opposing party may introduce the remainder or so much thereof
as is required to place that part originally offered in proper context so that a correct and
true meaning is conveyed to the jury." Lawson v. G.D. Searle & Co., 64 Ill.2d 543, 356
N.E.2d 779 (1976). See also FED. R. EVID. 106; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 34, § 21; 4
CALLAGHAN'S ILLINOIS EVIDENCE §§ 535, 599 (1967); 2 GARD, ILLINOIS EVIDENCE
RULES § 15:31 (1979); M. Graham, supra note 12, § 1002.2.
190. 109 Ill. 2d 327, 487 N.E.2d 613 (1985).
191. Id. at 330, 487 N.E.2d at 614.
192. Id. at 335, 487 N.E.2d at 618.
193. Id. at 331, 487 N.E.2d at 615.
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concerning the defendant's statements.'94 Although the defendant's statements were tape recorded, the State did not play the
tapes.1 95 During his case, the defendant attempted to play the recordings of the statements. 196 The trial court, however, refused to
admit the tape recorded statements, finding that the tapes would be
cumulative and might confuse the jurors who already had heard
police officers' testimony about the interviews.1 97
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that the due
process considerations, as well as the rule of completeness, dictated
that the defendant be allowed to place before the jury "all that the
defendant said."' 98 The court held that cross-examination of the
officers did not limit a defendant's right to later disclose all of a
conversation. 99 The court further noted that when one party offers evidence of a conversation, the tape recording of the conversation may have independent relevance. 200 The supreme court also
emphasized that testimony of the police officers did not remedy the
trial court's refusal to admit the tape recording because the defendant's demeanor and voice inflections could have affected the jury's
assessment of the statement's credibility. 20 Accordingly, the court
held that the tape is admissible, subject to the establishment of an
adequate foundation.20 2
194. Id.
195. Id. at 331, 487 N.E.2d at 615.
196. Id. at 333, 487 N.E.2d at 616.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 334, 487 N.E.2d at 616. This could be done by cross-examining the officers or through the defendant's own witnesses. Id.
199. Id. at 335, 487 N.E.2d at 617.
200. Id. See, e.g., People v. Henenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 5, 302 N.E.2d 27 (jury allowed to
view photographs of crime victim after witnesses testified orally about victim's condition); People v. Robinson, 104 Ill. App. 3d 20, 432 N.E.2d 340 (3rd Dist. 1982) (jury
allowed to hear recorded telephone conversation because it bolstered other evidence);
People v. Nahas, 9 Ill. App. 3d 570, 292 N.E.2d 466 (3rd Dist. 1973) (jury allowed to
hear recorded evidence after identical oral testimony).
201. Williams, 109 Ill. 2d at 337, 487 N.E.2d at 618.
202. Id. at 338, 487 N.E.2d at 618. To establish an adequate foundation, a witness
must testify that the tape accurately portrays the conversation in question. United States
v. Buzzard, 540 F.2d 1383, 1386 (10th Cir. 1976); People v. McCommon, 79 Ill. App. 3d
853, 867, 399 N.E.2d 224, 234 (1st Dist. 1979); People v. Spicer, 61111. App. 3d 748, 758,
378 N.E. 2d 169, 177 (5th Dist. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 79 Ill. 2d 173, 403 N.E.2d
221 (1979). The court in Williams ruled that the defendant was not required to establish
chain of custody when the tape had been in the exclusive control of the State. Williams,
109 Ill.2d at 338, 487 N.E.2d at 618.
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BURDENS OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS

A. Administrative Hearings
In Bd. of Educ. of Chicago v. State Bd. of Educ.,2°3 the Illinois

Supreme Court held that the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof is proper in tenured teacher dismissal proceedings
even though the charged conduct may have been criminal in nature.2 4 In the case at issue, the Chicago Board of Education
sought to dismiss a tenured schoolteacher for cause, based, in part,
on his offering a student money to kill school officials and his failure to report a sale of cocaine.2"5 The lower courts had held that
the hearing officer erred in applying the preponderance standard
rather than a clear and convincing standard.2 "6 The supreme court
reversed, explaining that a uniform standard of proof in all tenured
teacher dismissal proceedings was necessary to provide the liti20 7
gants and hearing officers with certainty in standards of proof.

The court, however, was careful to state that this holding should
not be expanded to all administrative proceedings or even to all
cases involving public agencies.20 8
The supreme court also asserted that its result comported with
due process.20 9 In determining the extent of process due, the court
applied a three part balancing test which weighed the following
factors: (1) the private interests of the teacher; (2) the risk of error
created by the chosen procedure; and (3) any countervailing governmental interests supporting the use of a particular burden of

proof.210 Weighing the interests at hand, the court held that the

private loss was not overwhelming because it was not necessarily
permanent in nature. 21 1 The court also explained that any stigma

involved in the loss of a teaching position did not implicate a fun203. 113 Ill. 2d 173, 497 N.E.2d 484 (1986).
204. Id. at 189, 497 N.E.2d at 990.
205. Id. at 176-79, 497 N.E.2d at 485-86. A hearing officer held that the Board failed
to sustain its charge by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 177, 497 N.E.2d at 985.
The circuit court held that the preponderance of evidence standard was proper. Id. The
appellate court, however, held that the clear and convincing standard was appropriate.
Id.
206. Id. at 177, 497 N.E.2d at 985. To the contrary, the lower courts found that the
hearing officer's error was harmless in light of the fact that his findings were not against
the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. at 203, 497 N.E.2d at 985.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 194, 497 N.E.2d at 993.
210. Id. at 192-94, 497 N.E.2d at 992-93. Although not cited by the Bd. of Educ.
court, this test finds its genesis in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
211. Bd. of Educ., 113 Ill. 2d at 193, 497 N.E.2d at 992. The court contrasted the
teacher's private interests with attorney disciplinary proceedings in which the clear and
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damental interest. 1 2 Consequently, the court concluded that the
private interests involved failed to outweigh the school board's legitimate interest in protecting students, faculty, and administrators
from harm. 2 13 Finally, the court opted for the preponderance standard because it was less likely to allow an "unfit individual" to
continue to teach.21 4
VII.
A.

PRIVILEGE

Hospital Records

In Poole v. Moline Public Hospital,2 5 the Illinois Appellate
Court for the Third District considered the limited issue of
whether a child is entitled to a hospital's labor and delivery room
records relating to his birth. The court ordered the delivery of the
hospital records sought by the child.21 6
In Poole, the plaintiff was born brain damaged at the defendant's
hospital. 2 7 The trial court denied the plaintiff's request for the
hospital to release the labor and delivery room records concerning
his birth.21 8 The hospital asserted that the records contained privileged information about the noncustodial mother. 2 19 Although the
court allowed the plaintiff's attorney to see the records concerning
the actual birth, it prohibited access to the mother's records from
the time she entered the hospital until the birth.22 °
The appellate court observed that the labor and delivery room
records of the mother and child contained substantially relevant
and material birth information.2 21 In addition, the court concluded that giving preference to the mother's privacy over the
child's right to his birth information would serve no public or private interest.2 22 Accordingly, the court ordered the hospital to reconvincing standard is more appropriate because disbarment is a permanent punishment.
Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 194, 487 N.E.2d at 993.
214. Id.
215. 138 Ill. App. 3d 20, 485 N.E.2d 502 (3rd Dist. 1985).
216. Id. at 22, 485 N.E.2d at 504.
217. Id. at 21, 485 N.E.2d at 503.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 21-22, 485 N.E.2d at 503.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 22, 485 N.E.2d at 503. The court referred to data such as the infant's fetal
heart tones, dilation, and position in the birth canal from the beginning of labor until
birth. Id.
222. Id. at 21, 485 N.E.2d at 503. The child's right to the information is based upon
an Illinois statute which provides:
Every private and public hospital shall, upon the request of any patient who has
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lease the requested records.223
VIII.

CONCLUSION

During the Survey year, Illinois supreme court and appellate
court decisions addressed several issues affecting Illinois evidentiary law. Of particular significance, supreme court decisions deliniated the permissible use of evidence for the impeachment of
witnesses and liberalized the rules concerning opinion testimony.
Both the supreme and appellate courts considered the admissability of computerized information. Finally, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District adopted Federal Rule of Evidence
406.

been treated in such hospital and after his or her discharge therefrom, permit
the patient, his or her physician or authorized attorney to examine the hospital
record, including but not limited to the history, bedside notes, charts, pictures
and plates, kept in connection with the treatment of such patient and permit
copies of such records to be made by him or her or his or her physician or
authorized attorney. A request for examination of the records shall be in writing and shall be delivered to the administrator of such hospital.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-2001 (1985).
223. Poole, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 22, 485 N.E.2d at 504.

